Monday, 3 August 2009

Inflation vs Hyperinflation vs Deflation (again).

This issue is so critical and yest so hard to decide that I think it is worth looking at from every possible point of view. I'm going to make two lists, one for things that increase the money supply and one of things that decrease it:

("customers" = individuals, businesses, foreign governments etc. MS = money supply. MB = monetary base)
Don't forget that MB is much smaller than MS.

Factors that can lead to increases:
  • Customers taking out new loans from banks. (Directly increases MS)
  • Governments printing money to buy their own bonds to "pay" for their debt. (Directly increases MB)
  • Governments printing money expressly for the purposes of avoiding deflation. (Directly increases MB)
  • Lowering reserve requirements (gives permission to increase MS via extra allowed loans, but that's if the banks can find suitable borrowers)
  • Lowering capital requirements (gives permission to increase MS via extra allowed loans, but that's if the banks can find suitable borrowers)
Factors that can lead to decreases:
  • Customers paying back loans to banks (Directly decreases MS)
  • Customers defaulting on bank loans (Directly decreases MS)
  • Raising reserve requirements (leads to decreased MS)
  • Raising capital requirements (leads to decreased MS)
I know this does not answer the question of whether we are going to have inflation or deflation in the next few years, but I hope that it at least breaks down the problem in to more manageable chunks. I'd love to hear you comments on A) have I got the right things in the lists and B) what are the prospects for the future developments of size of each of the items in the lists.

Saturday, 1 August 2009

Laissez-faire economics is sub-optimal - a proof.

There are many people that seem to believe that the solution to every problem in economics can be solved by removing regulation and "letting the markets decide". Other people disagree and will produce all sorts of "hand waving" arguments to explain why that's sub-optimal. I recently realized that a certain, reasonably well studied, statistical conundrum has a striking parallel to a problem in economics and its study could remove the need for some of these "hand waving" arguments and replace them with mathematical proof. The conundrum is known as "the multi-armed bandit problem" - but before I explain what it is, or its solution, I'd better explain the problem in economics that I believe it so neatly parallels.

The problem in economics is this: who should make new product X. Communists might say "lets have an expert government committee choose a single company Y and only allow them to make it" whereas the free marketeers would say "let multiple companies A, B, C, D and E make it and the market will decide which is the best and let the others go bust - and for gods sake don't let the government interfere with this process!".

Now I will introduce the statistical conundrum. Its called the multi-armed bandit problem:
Imagine you have a collection of one armed bandits in a casino. Each one has a certain "payout rate" which corresponds to the percentage of the money paid in to it, that it will pay out (in the long run). In real casinos this is often set at something like 80-90 percent, but imagine that this particular model of one armed bandit can be set to a any predefined payout rate (0% to 100%) using a dial inside the machine that the casino owner can set with a screwdriver. Now let’s say that one night the casino owner comes in and sets each bandit to a different payout rate, no two are the same. Now you arrive the following morning with a great big bag of coins. You are determined to spend the whole day playing on these bandits and you have complete freedom to choose which ones you play on... you are allowed to switch from one to another at will. Now the question is, what is your strategy for selecting bandits such that you come home with the greatest winnings?

I'll give you one possible solution: put 50 coins in each of the bandits in order to make an estimate of the payout rates. Then stick to the one that appeared to have the highest rate for the rest of the day. This solution is certainly better that simply selecting the bandits at random, but can be mathematically proven to be sub-optimal, i.e. there are known strategies that will lead to greater winnings. One problem with this strategy is that if two bandits paid out rather good, but very similar, amounts than it may not be very clear which is better. It may be more profitable to continue playing these two for a greater number of trials to gain more confidence in your determination of which is the best one. The problem illustrates what is known as an "exploitation-exploration dilemma". The "exploration" referring to the effort exploring which bandit may be the best (e.g. the 50 coin trial at the start) and the "exploitation" refers to simply repeatedly playing the bandit which you estimate is the best.

I believe this conundrum is analogous to the process of choosing companies to make products in a free market. The bandits are like the companies, the payouts are like the goods and the gambler is like the public, choosing the “company” that produces the best “goods”. At the start of the process the gambler/public does not know for sure who can make the best version of product X so he must try each one. Then, if it becomes obvious that some companies are better than others, the known bad companies will cease to be tried (= “go bust”) while the still-possibly-best will get tried some more.

Now there is one more complication that needs to be added to the standard multi-armed bandit problem to make it even more analogous to real life business. There is a variation called the “restless bandit problem” where the payout rates are not fixed but rather, evolve over time. This is more like a real company where the management and employees will change over time. Their manufacturing equipment may wear our, break or become redundant and a host of other things may happen that will change the ability of the company to produce good products. Now in the restless bandit problem it is essential to do more “exploration” than in the case of the standard multi-armed bandit problem. You would never want to entirely give up trying a previously poorly performing bandit because it may have now evolved into a better performing bandit.

It can be mathematically proven that for the restless bandit problem, a strategy of “playing all for a short while and then exclusively playing on the one that appeared best forever more” is a sub-optimal strategy. There is too little “exploration”. It is sub optimal for at least two reasons.

1. You may be mistaken in your estimate of which one is the best (how could this be?**)
2. The true best bandit may change over time.

This result has important implications for free marketeers. I believe it proves that the free market is sub optimal. This is because a free market acts like the “too little exploration” strategy. The thing is that in a free market, companies that fall short of producing the best goods tend to go bust even if they only fall short by a small margin. Obviously when a company goes bust, it can never be “tried” again, it doesn’t get a second chance. The succeeding company (or very small number of companies) tends to grow and dominate the market. Once a company dominates a market then it can start to raise its prices and employ a plethora of strategies to suppress rivals, that have nothing to do with producing the best goods for the consumer. For example:

• Tying up exclusive distribution channels
• Using your size to get raw materials for less than any new rivals can
• Using your size to negotiate higher prices from retailers than any new rivals could.

These factors make the “too little exploration” strategy even more sub-optimal in the restless bandit domain because it’s as if, as soon as we make up our minds and settle on the bandit that we think is best, it almost certainly reduces its payout rate.

Now in the exploration-exploitation dilemma, it is perfectly possible to do too much exploration. In the extreme that would be like playing all of the bandits equally often. And this can easily be proven to be sub optimal. So there is a balance to be struck.

In the real world there are many things that could be done to make sure that there is enough “exploration” in an economy, many of which are already in place to a greater or lesser extent in many countries around the world. Any laws that aim to prevent monopolies or encourages overly large companies to split in to smaller parts are a good start. So, one might say that effectively the world is already aware of the problem. But I hope that this article A) gives some mathematical support for these kind of policies and B) proves that free market fundamentalism is a sub-optimal strategy.
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** Say you have 2 bandits A and B. A has a payout rate of 60% (in the long run), B has a payout rate of 70% (in the long run). If the sample you have measured so far is small (e.g. 10 coins or so) then it is very easy for A to have paid out more than B just by fluke. The same kind of "mistake" can happen in the economic world with two companies. Say you have two companies A and B. Say that company A is currently fundamentally better than company B, it's management are smarter, it's workers are more hard working etc and in the long run, given a choice of 10 yet-to-be-invented products to make, it would make 9 of them better than B would. Unfortunately the first of these products to be invented was the one product it makes worse than B so the consumer would incorrectly guess that B was the better company.

Wednesday, 1 July 2009

Properties of monetary systems

The following article is thinking out loud...

How can it possibly be that some leading economists think we need to worry about deflation, while at the same time other leading economists think we need to worry about hyperinflation? The answer I believe is our damned fractional reserve banking system. The way it behaves is just so hard to understand. I believe this is fundamentally because it so poorly reflects the true nature of trade. Let me explain with a little thought experiment and some mathematics:

Imagine a "barter" system which had developed in the modern world. Imagine that all sorts of sophisticated transactions were arranged with the help of some I.T. and a good legal system such that you could have phenomena like lending and investment and all the "financial" interactions you'd expect in a capitalist system. You could envisage the flow of goods and services between people as a flow or vector field. This field would have both "sources" and "sinks". With the sources corresponding to the addition of value (e.g. assembling raw materials in to goods) and sinks corresponding to the loss of value (wearing out of goods).

The I.T. and the legal contracts would have to be very complex indeed to make this work and so people may want to introduce a system of "money" to simplify things. Now it seems obvious to me that the money system should as accurately as possible mirror the transactions that are going on in this barter system and an easy way to imagine this, is to consider that we have cash that simply flows in the opposite direction to the goods. You would have two equal and opposite vector fields. Unfortunately money can not do this precisely because it can not have sources and sinks in the same way as goods, but it would be a close approximation and money can always adjust its own value to make up for the minor discrepancies.

So why then have we ended up with this crazy fractional reserve banking system in which the total amount of money in the system can grow and shrink by a factor of ten!! In what way does that mirror the flow of trade?

I believe that the immense difficulties of understanding the world economy are largely due to this non-correspondence.

Saturday, 27 June 2009

My experience with Wikipedia

I recently had a go at making a couple of edits of some disingenuous statements in the "Fractional Reserve Banking" section in Wikipedia. Now maybe I need to R.T.F.M., but the F.M. of Wikipedia seems just endless... It seems that after you make an edit you are supposed to explain your changes in a single line of text... which I duly did. But in no time at all someone undid my changes giving no explanation whatsoever. Then I tried to contact him through Wikipedia so that we could perhaps resolve the disagreement between us, but I found that I was barred from doing so because I wasn't a sufficiently established user. I was stumped. So now I have just tried making one of my edits again, stating that I'd like some explanation if anyone wanted to undo it. I wanted to add as part of my explanation that anyone about to undo my change should contact me but it seemed that the space Wikipedia allowed me was not big enough for such a sentence! I'm sure I have something wrong here - if anyone would like to explain to me the error of my ways please do.

Thursday, 25 June 2009

One of many flaws in fractional reserve banking

With our current fractional reserve banking system system, if the government want to create P new dollars in order to fund an emergency project, it is inevitable in the long run, whether they like it or not, that the money supply will grow by 10 times P, or should I say M times P, where M is the money multiplier (currently rumored to be around 10 ish). Is this really desirable?

While I'm on the subject, can anyone point me in the direction of a really good argument in support of fractional reserve banking (as opposed to 100% reserve banking)? I've seen all sorts of articles saying "it ain't as bad as people think" in response to criticisms, but I'm struggling to find an article which positively says "its really good and here's why".

Friday, 19 June 2009

Did the Fed double the money supply?

I just watched this YouTube video in which Ron Paul said the the Fed had just doubled the money supply. But (thinking out loud here), I suspect that what the fed have just done is doubled the monetary base, which is not the same thing at all. The money supply can only expand up to is maximum (as allowed by fractional reserve limits) if the banks can find enough people who are both willing to borrow and a good enough bet that they can pay back. Now it strikes me that if there is a sustained period in which people are reluctant to borrow, then we may not get hyperinflation after all. We may instead end up in a situation like Japan with a combination of near zero interest rates combined with close to zero inflation.

The banks would of course hate this scenario with a passion because with no borrowing their profits will dissapear. So they will try every trick in the book to get people to borrow more.

Friday, 12 June 2009

World's biggest financial news story

It seems that this story is being kept quiet. I wonder why?

Stop press: I've just heard an exceptionally good analysis of this story by Max Keiser in this broadcast - its all to do with "Peek-a-boo accounting". Youtube vid here.

UPDATE 21st June: here.